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The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law
Patricia L. Belliat
INTRODUCTION
In March 2007, Google announced a change in its data retention
policy: that it would "anonymize" search data in its server logs after
eighteen to twenty-four months.' For many observers, the policy change
was more significant for the past practice it confirmed than for the fu-
ture practice it heralded. The policy change underscored that since it
first launched its search service, Google had stored its users' search
queries, along with the search results on which the users clicked, indefi-
nitely, and had done so in such a way that this data could be tied to the
particular computers from which the queries were made.'
Although Google's privacy policy has long stated what kinds of
information the company collects and discloses, that policy has never
mentioned Google's data retention practices.' Nor does US law sig-
nificantly constrain data retention practices, whether by the data sub-
ject herself or by a third party (such as Google) that transacts business
with the data subject.' Our surveillance and information privacy laws,
t Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I thank A.J. Bellia, Susan Freiwald, Nicole
Garnett, John Nagle, Ira Rubenstein, and Paul Schwartz for helpful comments and discussions,
and research librarian Christopher O'Byrne for expert research assistance.
I See Peter Fleischer and Nicole Wong, Taking Steps to Further Improve Our Privacy
Practices, The Official Google Blog (Mar 14, 2007), online at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2007/03/taking-steps-to-further-improve-our.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
2 More precisely, Google links search information to a persistent "cookie"-a small file
containing a string of characters-that uniquely identifies the user's browser. Google transmits
this cookie when a user's browser first contacts Google's servers, and the cookie persists until it
expires or is deleted. Google sets its cookies to expire in 2038. Adam Cohen, What Google
Should Roll Out Next: A Privacy Upgrade, NY Times A18 (Nov 28, 2005) ("It is hard to believe
most Google users know they have a cookie that expires in 2038.").
3 For the current and past versions of Google's privacy policy, see Google Privacy Policy
(Oct 14, 2005), online at http://www.google.com/privacypolicy.html (visited Jan 12, 2008); Google
Privacy Policy (July 1, 2004), online at http://www.google.com/privacy.archive.htm (visited Jan 12,
2008); Google Privacy Policy (Aug 14, 2000), online at http://www.google.com/privacy-archive-
2004.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
4 For discussion of two sector-specific US statutes that do limit data retention, see note 49.
The European approach to data privacy is quite different. The European Union's data protection
directive regulates the processing of personal data. The directive regulates the procedures by
which a data controller can process data (for example, requiring the controller to notify a super-
vising authority in the member state of the data processing permitted); the purpose for which the
data processing can occur; and the rights of the data subject to access the data and demand recti-
fication, deletion, or blocking of data that is inaccurate or not being processed in accordance
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in short, contain a "memory gap": they regulate the collection and
disclosure of certain kinds of information, but they say little about its
retention. In addition, much of what the law does say about collection
and disclosure provides incentives for indefinite data retention.
The law's memory gap has ever-increasing significance for the
applicability of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement to gov-
ernment surveillance activities. When government agents' direct, on-
going observations of a target's activities would invade a reasonable
expectation of privacy, agents ordinarily must obtain a warrant before
engaging in those observations. The reasonable expectation of privacy
test derives from Katz v United States,' a case dealing specifically with
surveillance to collect the contents of communications,' but the test
applies to other surveillance activities as well. In Kyllo v United
States,7 for example, the Supreme Court applied Katz to invalidate
agents' use of thermal imaging technology to acquire details about
heat patterns inside a home.8
Current Fourth Amendment doctrine, however, takes a dramati-
cally different approach to government agents' indirect, surveillance-
like activities, even when those activities yield precisely the same infor-
mation as-or more information than-direct observation. More spe-
cifically, in its "business records" cases, the Supreme Court has held that
the warrant requirement is not implicated when a third party collects
information (even under a statutory mandate) and the government
then obtains that information from the third party. In United States v
Miller,'o for example, the Court held that government did not violate
the Fourth Amendment by presenting a subpoena rather than a warrant
with data protection rules. See Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, 38 Off J Eur Communities (L 281) 31 (Nov 23, 1995).
5 389 US 347 (1967).
6 Id at 348 (describing the placement of an electronic listening device on a public telephone
booth to capture the target's end of conversations). More precisely, the test derives from Justice
Harlan's opinion in Katz, id at 361 (Harlan concurring) (describing a "twofold requirement, first,
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable"'), which was adopted by
the Court in subsequent cases. See, for example, Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 740 (1979).
7 533 US 27 (2001).
8 Id at 40.
9 See United States v Miller, 425 US 435,440 (1976). See also Smith, 442 US at 743-45. The
rationale for these cases is that one who conveys information to a third party, even for a limited
purpose, assumes the risk that the third party will convey that information to the government. I
critique the doctrinal basis for this approach elsewhere. See Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law
through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1375, 1397-1402 (2004) (arguing that Miller im-
properly conflated two distinct lines of cases, one involving government access to corporate
records and the other involving the risk that third parties with whom one communicates will
reveal information to the government).
10 425 US 435 (1976).
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to compel a bank to disclose records concerning the defendant's bank
accounts-records that the bank was statutorily required to collect."
Because the government can only compel disclosure of that
which is retained, the scope of the business records "exception" to
Katz is deeply dependent on data storage practices, and thus on the
legal, technological, and economic forces that drive those practices. As
I will argue, current and developing data retention practices threaten
to convert many of the government surveillance activities now subject
to a warrant requirement into the sort of "indirect" surveillance at
issue in- and unprotected by- Miller. This threat is perhaps easiest to
see in the context of communications surveillance, where shifts in in-
formation storage trends may render Katz itself (and the statutes built
on its foundation) a dead letter.2 But other data trends are equally
significant. Stand-alone products that generate no data are increas-
ingly giving way to third-party services that do; such services will yield
a profile of behavior that could otherwise only be assembled with di-
rect surveillance activities.'3 Similarly, the trend toward "pervasive"
computing will produce vast amounts of data that is capable of being
stored by third parties and that mirrors data government agents could
otherwise obtain only via direct observation."
Information held by third parties has always flowed to govern-
ment agents in some measure, and so it may be tempting to argue that
evolving patterns of data storage raise no new doctrinal or normative
concerns. From a doctrinal perspective, Miller and its progeny hold
that one lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in items that one
voluntarily surrenders to a third party, and so the conclusion that data
stored in digital form with third parties is outside of the Fourth
Amendment's protective core is fairly straightforward.'" From a nor-
mative perspective, if one accepts the business records doctrine (either
on first principles or on the view that the doctrine is well entrenched),
a principled basis on which to distinguish data in digital form from
data in other forms is not readily apparent, particularly if one believes
that the law should be neutral as to modes or forms of communication
and storage.
11 Idat441.
12 See Part II.A.
13 See Part I.C.
14 See Part I.D.
15 As I argue later, however, that conclusion is less straightforward when it comes to the
contents of communications stored by third parties rather than data generated in interactions
with third parties. See Part II.A.2. See also Bellia, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1403-12 (cited in note
9) (arguing that Miller and Smith should not be read to suggest that an individual lacks an expec-
tation of privacy simply because information was conveyed to a third party).
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I argue that the significance of current and developing data stor-
age trends lies in the shift toward an architecture of increasingly "per-
fect" memory. Fourth Amendment doctrine has always permitted data
to flow from third parties to the government. Importantly, however,
that doctrine and the laws that supplement it have also coexisted with
technological and economic factors that produce surveillance gaps.
The dominant architecture of the predigital era was an architecture of
forgetting: data about most of our activities could not be captured at all,
could be memorialized only imperfectly, or could be retained long term
only at significant cost. As these constraints on memory erode, so too
will the zones of information privacy they have supported.
Observing that the shift toward an architecture of perfect mem-
ory will have important consequences for surveillance and privacy
does not resolve how (if at all) the law should respond to that shift.
Put another way, it is not obvious why the law should privilege surveil-
lance gaps and imperfections, even if such imperfections have existed
in the past. Indeed, lawmakers seem poised to move in the opposite
direction-to mandate rather than curb the retention of data, particu-
larly data concerning communications activity. I nevertheless argue
that the law should play a role in blunting the surveillance-enhancing
effects of our changing architecture of memory.
I begin in Part I by exploring the trends toward an architecture of
perfect memory. In addition to discussing general trends in digital
storage, I explore two ongoing trends that change the architecture of
digital memory: (1) the pulling of communications and data from net-
work "endpoints," such as a personal computer, into the network itself
(and thus from an individual data subject to a third-party data holder);
and (2) the trend toward "pervasive" computing, which will involve
the generation and storage of massive amounts of environmental and
experiential data about day-to-day activities. In Part II, across differ-
ent categories of data, I explore the divergent legal frameworks that
regulate what I call "direct" and "indirect" government surveillance
16 See, for example, HR 837, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 6, 2007), in 153 Cong Rec H 1270
(Feb 6, 2007) (proposing a requirement that the Attorney General to issue regulations governing
retention of 1SP records). The text of this draft bill is also available at http://www.govtrack.us/
data/us/bills.text/110/h/h837.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008). The European Union has adopted a data
retention directive obligating member states to adopt requirements that communications pro-
viders retain certain categories of traffic data for between six months and two years. Covered
data includes information regarding the source, destination, duration, and type of communica-
tion, as well as information necessary to identify a subscriber's communication equipment and, in
the case of mobile equipment, its location. See Council Directive 2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006
on the Retention of Data, 49 Off J Eur Communities (L 105) 54 (Apr 13, 2006). The data must be
retained "in such a way that the data retained and any other necessary information relating to such
data can be transmitted upon request to the competent authorities without undue delay." Id at 59.
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activities. In particular, I explore how the absence of constraints on
data retention, coupled with limited constraints on information trans-
fer, provide incentives for private parties to retain data indefinitely,
thereby exposing such data to a weaker legal regime than would apply
if government agents sought to acquire the data directly. Finally, in
Part III, I consider how the law has responded and should respond to
these trends.
I. TOWARD AN ARCHITECTURE OF PERFECT MEMORY
Collections of data about individuals are not new. The rise of net-
worked technology, however, has intensified concerns that collections
of data in digital form can be searched, copied, and merged with other
data sources to form increasingly complete data profiles.7 Professor
Daniel Solove has written extensively about the development of these
detailed databases-"digital dossiers," as he calls them."
The extensive computer databases Professor Solove describes are
the product of the dramatic advances in digital storage technology
over the last half century, which enable companies to store extraordi-
nary quantities of records compactly and at ever-declining cost. Those
companies can include both the entities with which we do business-
retailers, telephone companies, airlines-and the intermediaries that
facilitate our transactions-banks, credit card companies, ISPs, and so
on. In addition, those companies can include database companies with
which we have no direct relationship, but that mine for personal data
from public and private sources and "rent" such data for marketing
and other purposes.
This Part explores how these technological and market trends, as
well as other trends I describe below, are changing the "architecture"
of memory. Two aspects of this changing architecture are significant.
First, digital memory is becoming increasingly "perfect": the low cost
of storing vast quantities of data in digital form, and the ease of con-
verting nondigital information into digital form, removes many of the
incentives of businesses and individuals alike to destroy data. Second,
data previously held by the individual whom the data concerns is in-
creasingly held by third parties-even third parties with whom the
data subject has no business relationship.
17 See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
Stan L Rev 1373, 1374 (2000).
18 See Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age,
13-26 (NYU 2004); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S Cal L Rev 1083,1089-95 (2002).
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I begin in Part L.A by discussing some of the technology and cost
trends in digital storage. I do so in detail in part because a sense of the
state of technology at various points in time is useful for evaluating
the legal framework, which I undertake in Parts II and III. In Parts I.B
and I.C, I then discuss other trends pushing toward an architecture of
increasingly perfect memory. In addition to the transactional activities
on which Professor Solove focuses, I discuss two other trends: (1) a
shift in storage and processing capabilities away from network "end-
points"-such as personal computers-to the center of the network
(or of multiple overlapping networks); and (2) trends toward "ubiqui-
tous" or "pervasive" computing.
A. The Technology and Cost of Data Storage
Digital technology is simply one of many in a succession of tech-
nologies that enable us to generate, retain, and transmit information
more cheaply. Data retention has long been a commercial goal, not to
mention a broader collective and individual goal among those seeking to
preserve generational memory. Until the last half century, however, the
expense of storing, indexing, and preserving access to information has
required careful choices between maintaining and purging information.
Developments in data storage technology now make indefinite
data retention feasible for businesses and individuals alike. Although
these developments are difficult to quantify, I illustrate the shifts in
the technology and cost of storage in two ways. First, I examine trends
in one type of "low-end" storage medium-the hard drive-which
remains the most ubiquitous digital storage medium among consum-
ers. Second, I discuss trends in "high-end" storage by focusing on the
re-emergence of a specialized online storage industry.
1. Cost and density trends in hard-drive storage.
Digital technology involves the conversion of data -whether text,
audio, or images-into a series of "binary digits" (also known as
"bits"), each taking a value of zero or one. Storage of the resulting
data is measured in "bytes," a term that in modern computer usage
refers to a collection of eight bits. A kilobyte (KB) represents one
thousand bytes; a megabyte (MB) represents one million bytes; and a
gigabyte (GB) represents one billion bytes.'9 Once converted to digital
19 The figures in the text and elsewhere in this article rely on the decimal rather than bi-
nary sense of the International System of Units (SI) prefixes. Because early computers used
binary (base 2) rather than decimal (base 10) addressing methods to access system memory, the
SI prefixes traditionally associated with multiples of 10 (1000) were instead associated with
multiples of 2'0 (1024). Some confusion remains in this regard, particularly because many operat-
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form, data can be stored through many different processes, including
mechanical processes (used to mark data on punch cards and paper
tape), magnetic processes (used to record data on magnetic tapes,
hard drives, and floppy disks), optical processes (used to "burn" CDs
and DVDs), and electrical processes (used in connection with flash
memory on memory cards or flash drives).
Focusing on the cost and storage density of hard drives gives some
sense of how dramatically the cost of storage as fallen, at the same time
that storage density has increased dramatically. Magnetic storage con-
tinues to be the dominant form of storage for data," and hard drives
account for some 50 percent of total magnetic storage capacity shipped
each year." IBM introduced the first magnetic hard drive for commer-
cial data storage in 1956. The $50,000 system ($363,600 in today's dol-
lars) consisted of fifty disks, each two feet in diameter, and could store 5
MB of data at a density of two thousand bits per inch.2" The first com-
mercially available hard drives for personal computers had appeared by
1980. In 1981, Seagate, which would become the world's largest pro-
ducer of disk drives, marketed its 5 MB hard drive with a diameter of
5.25 inches for $1,700 ($4,010.45 in today's dollars)-for users, a per-
megabyte cost of $340. In the mid-1980s, as Congress considered and
passed the main statute regulating electronic communications, the per-
megabyte cost of hard drive storage remained at $100 ($180.61 in to-
day's dollars). By 1999, the cost had fallen to less than ten cents per
megabyte, or less than $100 per gigabyte." Hard drive storage presently
costs consumers less than $1 per gigabyte.
Meanwhile, developments in magnetic processing have allowed
manufacturers to increase the density of stored information and thus
to reduce the size of storage devices. The IBM hard drive first intro-
duced in 1956 for commercial data could store data at a density of two
thousand bits per square inch. By 1981, data could be stored at a den-
ing systems still describe memory in binary terms. For example, an operating system might meas-
ure a hard drive marketed as having a 160 GB (or 160,000 MB) as having a capacity of 152,588
MB, with MB here used in the binary sense.
20 See Peter Lyman and Hal R. Varian, How Much Information? 2003 1 (Oct 30,2003), online
at http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/printable-report.pdf (vis-
ited Jan 12, 2008) (noting that, for 2002, approximately 92 percent of new information was stored
on magnetic media).
21 This percentage was calculated from id at 50-61, using figures for the annual storage
capacity of each form of magnetic storage.
22 Geoff Nairn, Drive to Replace Magnetic Storage, Financial Times 22 (Apr 20,1995); Research
History Highlights: History of IBM Research 1945-1998, online at http://www.research.ibm.com/
about/past-history.shtml (visited Jan 12,2008).
23 Ephraim Schwartz, Hot Seat; Seagate's Drive; CEO Alan E Shugart Shares the Storage
Giant's Take on NCs and Drive Technology, InfoWorld 25 (Nov 11, 1996).
24 D.A. Thompson and J.S. Best, The Future of Magnetic Data Storage Technology, 44 IBM
J Rsrch Dev 311,312 (May 2000).
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sity of more than twelve megabits (or twelve million bits) per square
inch,2 and by the mid-1980s, data could be stored at a density of
twenty megabits (or twenty million bits) per square inch. Storage
density had increased to 700 megabits (700 million bits) per square
inch by the mid-1990s" and to approximately 100 gigabits (100 billion
bits) per square inch by 2006,2 an increase over the 1956 density by a
factor of 500,000.
To make these capacity and density figures more meaningful, it is
useful to relate them to paper storage. If stored in digital form, the
text of a single typewritten page would occupy approximately 2 KB of
storage.2 Low-end desktop computers are currently marketed with
hard drives with at least 250 GB of storage: ° A large portion of that
storage will in practice be devoted to the computer's operating system
and other software, but in theory such a device-typically 3.5 inches
wide for a desktop computer-could store approximately 125 million
pages of text. The printed collection of the US Library of Congress, if
stored as text in digital form," would occupy fewer than sixty-three
such storage devices. Storing the equivalent of the US Library of Con-
gress's current printed holdings as text in digital form would have oc-
cupied at least twenty-five million square feet of storage in 1956, be-
tween thirty thousand and forty thousand square feet in 1981, and less
than sixty square feet in 2000.32
2. The resurgence of the mass online storage industry.
Although data regarding hard-drive storage and density can give
some sense of the overall shifts in the cost and technology involved in
storing data in digital form, the picture becomes fuller with a discus-
25 J.M. Harker, et al, A Quarter Century of Disk File Innovation, 25 IBM J Rsrch Dev 677,
678 (Sept 1981).
26 Thompson and Best, 44 IBM J Rsrch Dev at 312 (cited in note 24).
27 Id.
28 George Lawton, Working Today on Tomorrow's Storage Technology, 39 Computer 12, 19
(Dec 2006) (noting that current hard disk storage densities are 100 gigabits per square inch);
Sally Bryant, Hard-disk Drives: 50 Years and Going Strong, Solid State Technology S20 (Sept
2006) (reporting a one-inch drive with a twelve GB, or ninety-six gigabit, capacity);
29 See Lyman and Varian, How Much Information? at 3 (cited in note 20).
30 The lowest-priced desktop computer available on www.dell.com as of November 4, 2007,
was offered with 250 GB of storage. See http://www.dell.com/content/products/productdetailsaspx/
inspndt_53xs?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs&-tab=bundlestab (visited Jan 12,2008).
31 This calculation assumes that the printed collection of the Library of Congress, if con-
verted into digital form, would occupy ten terabytes (that is, 10,000 gigabytes). See Lyman and
Varian, How Much Information? at 3 (cited in note 20).
32 See E. Grochowski and R.D. Halem, Technological Impact of Magnetic Hard Disk
Drives on Storage Systems, 42 IBM Sys J 338, 340 (2003) (estimating the floor space required to
store one terabyte of data over the last several decades).
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sion of "higher-end" storage geared toward businesses. The emergence
of alternative storage models-and the resurgence of third-party stor-
age services-is itself a signal of the overwhelming amount of com-
mercial data storage at stake.
Any company that stores a substantial amount of data can man-
age its own servers or outsource that task to a company that special-
izes in providing secure storage services. As digital technology became
more widespread in the 1980s but storage capacity remained costly
and bulky, companies outsourced processing and storage tasks to third
parties, classified by a 1986 privacy statute33 as "remote computing
services.'" Third-party storage services are now re-emerging in a
somewhat different form, offering internet-accessible services and
storing data in server farms located throughout the country." The cost
of the server farms necessary to support mass online storage is sub-
36
stantial, but it allows companies to store and manage data more
cheaply than they could on their own. Amazon, for example, offers
companies such services through its Simple Storage Service ("Amazon
S3") at a rate of $0.15 per gigabyte of storage per month. 7
Online storage services, moreover, will increasingly target con-
sumers as well. In providing its Gmail users free storage space in ex-
change for the ability to display advertisements, Google is essentially
acting as an online storage service as well as a communications pro-
33 See Part II for a discussion of this statute.
34 18 USCA § 2711(2) (2007). See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, S Rep
No 99-541, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 10-11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 3564-65 (describing
generally the option to process data offsite); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
HR Rep No 99-647,99th Cong, 2d Sess 23 (1986).
35 See, for example, Paul Bray, The Source of Storage Services, Computer Reseller News UK
25 (May 14, 2007) (describing the growth in online storage and analogizing a corporation keeping
its own data to an individual stashing his or her cash under a mattress rather than in a bank); Zach
Patton, Betting the Farm, Governing 46 (Mar 2007) (discussing the boom of server farms and
questioning how much economic benefit they really bring to areas that have offered tax breaks
to attract companies building these data storage facilities); Stephanie N. Mehta, Behold the
Server Farm! Glorious Temple of the Information Age, Fortune 68 (Aug 7, 2006) (describing the
rapid construction and operation of server farms to house the data of "Google, Yahoo, MySpace,
and other Internet powers"); James Sherwood, The Online Storage Boom Is on Its Way, Computer
Reseller News UK (Apr 10, 2006) (analyzing the corporate movement to outsource their data
management online but warning that steps must be taken to maintain the security of the data).
36 Of particular concern are the energy costs involved both in powering and cooling the
servers. As a result, many storage companies have located server farms where electricity is least
expensive, such as near the Columbia River in the Pacific Northwest. See Blaine Harden, Tech
Firms Go Mining for Megawatts; Companies Rush to Exploit Region's Cheap Electricity, Wash
Post A3 (July 9, 2006).
37 Thomas Claburn, Companies Praise Financial Benefits for Amazon's Simple Storage
Service, InfoWeek (July 12,2006), online at http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?
articlelD=190302909 (visited Jan 12, 2008). See also Amazon S3, online at http://www.amazon.com/
gp/browse.html?node=16427261 (visited Jan 12,2008).
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vider. Google offers each user 2.8 GB of free memory; Yahoo recently
began offering users of its email service unlimited storage." Despite
the costs of the server farms necessary to support this sort of mass
online storage, industry participants predict that, on the consumer
side, ISPs will eventually offer mass storage as a managed service, in
the same way that they now offer internet connectivity." Indeed, in
March 2006, Google inadvertently leaked plans to release this sort of
functionality-a "GDrive" that would permit users to store files on
Google's servers and access them from any internet-enabled device."
In short, although it is difficult to quantify changes in the capacity
for digital storage, it is clear that those changes have been dramatic
and sustained. For individual consumers, the cost of storage is negligi-
ble; for those who are willing to tolerate advertising in the context of
email or other applications, storage is essentially free. For businesses,
storage costs are much more substantial, but the emergence of a mass
online storage industry both lowers those costs and testifies to the
overwhelming amount of data involved.
I do not contend that the changing capacity for digital storage it-
self demonstrates, or accounts for, a shift toward an architecture of
perfect memory. The cost of physical storage is simply one cost of re-
-taining data. In the absence of legal restrictions on data retention, and
with a permissive legal framework governing transfers of data among
private parties, two other costs are relevant here. First, how much data
is stored will depend in part on what data is generated in, or capable
of being cheaply converted into, a storable form. Second, the costs of
storing data include not only the costs of purchasing and maintaining
the hardware on which the information will be stored, but also the
additional costs of making the data usable through indexing, a search
functionality, or both.
In Parts I.B and I.C, I consider the changing architecture of mem-
ory in light of the costs of generating, converting, and accessibly main-
taining data. For ease of tying the discussion to the discussion of the
regulatory framework in Part II, I focus first on the contents of com-
38 Thomas Claburn, Yahoo Mail Promises Unlimited Storage, InfoWeek (Mar 28, 2007),
online at http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=198700845 (visited
Jan 12, 2008).
39 See Neil McAllister, Cleversafe Dreams of Distributed Mass Storage Service, InfoWorld
(Jan 8, 2007), online at http://www.infoworld.com/printthis/article/07/01/08/O2OPopenentl.html
(visited Jan 12, 2008) (noting that the CEO of Cleversafe declared, "[w]e're having trouble find-
ing ISPs that don't want to offer this kind of service").
40 Verne Kopytoff, Google's Gaffe Reveals Internal Secrets; Notes Inadvertently Offer a
Look at Financial Plans, Future Product, San Fran Chron C1 (Mar 8,2006). Google Docs, launched
in October 2006, is effectively an online storage service for data in certain formats. See Google Docs
Tour (2007), online at http://www.google.com/google-d-s/tourl.html (visited Jan 12,2008).
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munications and then on other data. With respect to both categories,
the general trends are the same: (1) data is being generated in digital
form (or easily converted to it); (2) with cost and access issues pulling
data to the network "center," even as costs of data storage at network
"endpoints" continue to fall; (3) enabling storage of data under a legal
regime that imposes minimal (if any) restrictions on data retention.
B. The Generation, Conversion, and Maintenance of
Communications Contents
1. Generation of more "storable" data.
The widespread adoption of digital technology generates more
communications contents in storable form. In the predigital era, one
could certainly retain all of one's written correspondence if physical
space constraints permitted. Until recording technology became
widely available in the twentieth century, face-to-face communications
could be memorialized, if at all, only in an imperfect written form.
Similarly, in the past, no copies of telephone calls existed as a matter
of routine; those communications could be memorialized only in writ-
ten form or, once recording technology became widely available, in
the unusual case in which a party to the telephone call (or an eaves-
dropper) actually took steps to record the conversation.
Electronic communications, in contrast, are "born" digital, and
thus are immediately stored or storable in compact form. Some copies
of electronic communications are retained under the control of the
sender or recipient, while other copies are retained by the third party
that provides email services to the sender or recipient. The develop-
ment of digital technology thus dramatically changes the volume of
communications that are stored-a category of communications in
which perfect storage (at least for some period of time) is the norm
displaces or supplements categories of communications involving im-
perfect or rare storage.
Electronic communications have not entirely supplanted tele-
phone calls, and so the memory of a user's communications is certainly
not complete. Yet with the development of Voice over Internet Proto-
col (VoIP) technology, telephone calls are shifting from a category of
rare and technically difficult storage to a category where routine stor-
age is technically feasible. Because VoIP involves the conversion of
sound into digital data, followed by its transmission over the internet,
telephone calls are technically similar to typical electronic communi-
cations, raising the possibility of routine network storage of such calls."
41 See Implementation of the USA PATRIOT ACT. Crime, Terrorism and the Age of
Technology, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of
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2. Pulling data to the network center.
Despite the fact that users can cheaply store electronic communi-
cations on their own hard drives, accessibility issues increasingly pull
communications away from network endpoints into the network cen-
ter. Service providers, of course, can retain backup copies of subscrib-
ers' communications on their own servers to ensure that those com-
munications are properly delivered. There is growing demand, how-
ever, for users to have greater storage space on the provider's servers
so that users can access communications from multiple internet-
enabled locations or devices. As noted above, some service providers
already provide high-volume storage at little or no cost; others are
likely to do so in the near future. The very goal of Gmail and similar
services is to entice users to maintain on Google's servers the commu-
nications that they might otherwise have maintained on their PCs.
3. Data retention restrictions and incentives.
Finally, the law imposes limited restrictions on the retention of
communications contents by service providers. Consider first the
communications that a provider retains in backup storage. The federal
statute governing the privacy of stored electronic communications, the
Stored Communications Act 2 (SCA), imposes no limitations on the
provider's practices in this regard. Indeed, the statute even requires
storage in some instances, specifically when a governmental entity
seeking access to a subscriber's communications includes in its sub-
poena or court order a requirement that the service provider create a
backup copy of the communications sought. 3 Outright restrictions on
storage of communications, if any, will necessarily come from the pro-
vider's contractual relationship with the subscriber or perhaps from
federal and state laws governing unfair trade practices, rather than
from direct retention restrictions.
There are, of course, other market forces that constrain a pro-
vider. First, a provider may perceive liability and other risks from un-
authorized release of a user's communications-risks that counsel in
favor of purging backup data. Second, there are some significant limi-
tations on the transfer of communications that may make long-term
retention less attractive to the provider itself (as opposed to the sub-
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong, 1st Sess 40 (2005) (testimony of Peter P.
Swire, Professor of Law, Ohio State University) ("Because VOIP uses the Internet to transmit
voice, ... ordinary users can and will have their phone conversations stored or cached at the
Internet network level.").
42 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Title II ("Stored Communications
Act"), Pub L No 99-508,100 Stat 1848, 1860, codified as amended at 18 USCA § 2701 et seq (2007).
43 18 USC § 2704(a)(1) (2000).
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scriber) than retention might be in other contexts. In particular, § 2702
of the SCA generally prohibits a provider of an electronic communica-
tion service from disclosing the contents of communications without the
consent of the originator or intended recipient of the communications."
However these incentives might affect the provider's backup
practices, the considerations for a user are quite different. If the user's
communications can remain on the provider's system for a specified
period of time or even indefinitely without cost to the user, the user
has little incentive to delete them. Moreover, as noted above, provid-
ers increasingly compete for subscribers' business by offering greater
storage space than the user would have on his or her own hard drive
or on other providers' systems. In light of user demand for central
storage, companies are likely to perceive that the liability risks of un-
authorized access are best addressed through security mechanisms
rather than constraints on subscribers' data retention.
C. The Generation, Conversion, and Maintenance of Other Data
1. Generation of more "storable" data.
With respect to other data, I have already alluded to the detailed
data trails that result from a user's online browsing, purchasing, and
related activities. Some of this data simply did not exist in the predigi-
tal world. Physically flipping through the yellow pages generates no
storable data; a search for the same information with a search engine
will generate information that is both capable of storage and likely to
be stored. Physically browsing the books in a bookstore or library gen-
erates a data trail only if one is being physically watched; a search for the
same books on Amazon will generate a data trail in every case. These
phenomena have been extensively considered elsewhere; the point for
now is simply that digital technology creates a pool of storable data, some
of which could otherwise be collected only by persistent physical obser-
vation and some of which would not be available even then.
2. Pulling data to the network center.
In many of the scenarios described above, third parties rather
than the data subject will control the data in question. An ISP may
44 See 18 USCA § 2702. A provider can disclose the contents of a communication to a law
enforcement agency if the contents were inadvertently obtained and appear to pertain to a
crime, or to any governmental entity if the provider believes that a danger of death or serious
physical injury requires disclosure without delay. 18 USCA § 2702(b). Although § 2702 makes
clear that service providers cannot transfer a subscriber's communications, it contains an impor-
tant substantive limitation: it applies only to providers of communications services to the public
See 18 USCA § 2702(a).
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maintain a log of its users' web browsing activities. A website owner
can maintain a log of the user's browsing activities on her site, or can
provide a link through which a transactional partner (such as an ad-
vertising service) will do so.
Two other significant trends in information technology are shift-
ing data from network endpoints to the network center. First, items
previously sold as stand-alone "products" are now becoming "ser-
vices," thereby allowing the collection and generation of information
by more third parties. For example, software providers now rarely of-
fer stand-alone software packages for users' PCs; they instead offer
something more like a software "service"-a software product that
builds in the capability to contact the provider's site for updates, to
validate the authenticity of the copy, and so on. These services facili-
tate the collection of data on usage of the software that was previously
unavailable (or confined to just the user's PC). Consider also the dif-
ference between a stand-alone VCR and a DVR offered by a cable
company or TiVo. The stand-alone VCR generates no data (except
that which might be observable by physical surveillance). Because the
DVR is linked to a service that provides programming information, it
generates data on which programs the user records. Indeed, some
DVRs offer central storage rather than storage on a set-top box, an
arrangement that necessarily entails the provider's collection of in-
formation about which programs the user records. Even with respect
to personal computers, software manufacturers are moving toward
placing applications themselves on the network rather than at its end-
points. Google Docs is an early example of such a web-based applica-
tion (and one whose use requires that a user shift her documents to
third-party storage with Google)."5 In short, as the product-becomes-
service trend continues to develop, the personal computer will become
less a collection of stand-alone software and more of a point of access
for multiple services.
This product-becomes-service model is closely tied to a second
trend in digital technology also involving a move away from the stand-
alone personal computer: the trend toward "ubiquitous" or "perva-
sive" computing.4' Under a ubiquitous computing model, everyday
objects, such as appliances, clothing, and food packages will be em-
45 See Google Docs Tour (cited in note 40).
46 See, for example, Jerry Kang and Dana Cuff, Pervasive Computing: Embedding the Pub-
lic Sphere, 62 Wash & Lee L Rev 93, 94 (2005) (forecasting that pervasive computing will spread
and make "the line between cyberspace and real space ... impossible" to identify); Susan W.
Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 Miss L J 1, 3 (2005)
(attempting to resolve whether the Fourth Amendment's privacy guarantees may be adapted to
a "world of ubiquitous technology").
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bedded with wireless computing technology. That technology will al-
low the routine tracking of minute details about our lives. A refrigera-
tor might issue a warning if food has passed a spoilage date; while at
the grocery store, with the aid of a PDA, I might be able to check how
many sticks of butter remain in my refrigerator at home. My washing
machine might alert me or adjust its settings if I mistakenly include
dark clothes in a load of white laundry.
Although such technology is still developing, it is clear that the
trend toward pervasive computing will produce a vast amount of data
that is capable of being stored, much of which could only otherwise be
gathered by physical observation. It remains to be seen whether that
data will remain in the hands of the data subject-that is, the technol-
ogy user-or whether it will be dispersed among third parties. Some
ubiquitous computing enthusiasts envision the use of technology to
create a unified, autobiographical "lifelog" - an archive that indis-
criminately records all personal activities and events.7 Such an ar-
chive, even if controlled and maintained by the technology user rather
than single or multiple third-party data holders, would significantly
transform the idea of memory as we know it. 8 If the product-
becomes-service model continues to prevail, the trend toward ubiqui-
tous computing may produce more data at the network center rather
than the network "endpoints." Moreover, to some extent, the conven-
ience that ubiquitous computing promises requires maintaining data
in a third party's hands.
3. Data retention restrictions and incentives.
As in the case of communication contents, outright restrictions on
the retention of other data generally flow from contractual privacy
arrangements or protections against unfair trade practices, not from
statutes specifically covering information privacy. There are sector-
specific exceptions, but those statutes require destruction of data only
when the data is no longer "necessary," and they leave the question of
47 See, for example, Alec Wilkinson, Remember This? A Project to Record Everything We
Do in Life, New Yorker 38 (May 28, 2007) (describing Gordon Bell's project to digitize all as-
pects of his life); Rachel Ross, Lifelog: A Useful, Brutal Reality Check; Logged on for Life, To-
ronto Star DOI (Sep 8, 2003) (questioning the virtues of digitally recording all aspects of an
individual's life, as in Gordon Bell's project).
48 See Martin Dodge and Rob Kitchin, The Ethics of Forgetting in an Age of Pervasive
Computing 11 (CASA Working Paper Series No 92, 2005), online at http://www.casa.ucl.ac.uk/
working-papers/paper92.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008) (arguing that "life-logs ... have significant
implications to the recording of the present and thus how the past is recalled as opposed to
remembered").
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necessity entirely within the data collector's discretion. Perceived
liability and other risks of data breaches may counsel in favor of purg-
ing data; on the other hand, the fact that private parties can with few
limitations transfer data to other private parties makes data retention
a potentially profitable activity. There are several sector-specific pri-
vacy statutes governing the transfer of data, including the Right to
Financial Privacy Actm (RFPA) (regulating disclosure of financial re-
cords), the Fair Credit Reporting Act5' (FCRA) (regulating disclosure
of identifying information and credit reports), the Cable Communica-
tions Privacy Act52 (regulating disclosure of cable viewing activities),
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988"3 (regulating disclosure of
video rental and sales records), and the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act" and its implementing rules (regulating disclo-
sure of protected health information). To the extent that explicit dis-
closure limitations are the exception rather than the rule, however, the
law provides incentives for companies to retain data in anticipation of
future transactions that may be beneficial.
D. Conclusion
This Part has highlighted some of the shifts in the architecture of
memory. The shift to digital technology has not only enabled cheap
storage of information but has also generated more information that
is "born" digital or capable of being made so, including information
that was previously unavailable or nonexistent. With respect to com-
munications contents, indefinite storage is attractive to subscribers
even if it raises security concerns for service providers. With respect to
the range of other data generated through digital transactions-
including data that previously could not be routinely captured-
current law provides at least some incentives for indefinite data reten-
tion by only loosely regulating transactions in data. As the product-
49 There are sector-specific exceptions. The Cable Communications Privacy Act, for exam-
ple, requires providers to "destroy personally identifiable information if the information is no
longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected." 47 USC § 551(e) (2000 & Supp
2004). Similarly, the Video Privacy Protection Act requires destruction of personally identifiable
information "as soon as practicable, but no later than one year from the date the information is
no longer necessary." 18 USC § 2710(e) (2000).
50 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 § 1103, Pub L No 95-360, 92 Stat 3697, codified at
12 USC § 3403 (2000).
51 Pub L No 91-508,84 Stat 1128, codified in relevant part at 15 USCA § 1681b (2007).
52 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 631, Pub L No 98-549, 98 Stat 2794-95,
codified at 47 USC § 551 (2000 & Supp 2001).
53 Pub L No 100-618,102 Stat 3195, codified at 18 USC § 2710 (2000).
54 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) § 262, Pub L No
104-191, 110 Stat 1936, 2021-31, codified at 42 USC § 1320d et seq (2000 & Supp 2001). See also
45 CFR § 160, 162, 164 ("HIPAA Privacy Rule").
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becomes-service model and the pervasive computing model take hold,
an architecture of data loss gives way to a developing architecture of
perfect memory-where much memory is under the control of third
parties rather than the data subject.
II. THE MEMORY GAP AND PRIVATE/GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION FLOWS
For government surveillance activities, the legal consequences of
the memory shifts described in Part I are quite significant. The in-
creasingly complete architecture of memory preserves more informa-
tion for government agents to draw from. Much of the data could not
have been gathered in the predigital era without substantial and costly
forms of physical observation, and in any event would have been
costly to memorialize. Moreover, as discussed below, the fact that such
information is largely held by third parties makes that information
accessible under weaker legal standards. Our "direct" surveillance
regimes-regulating government agents' use of surveillance devices
and other techniques to capture communications and data or other-
wise to observe a target's private activities-are highly protective of
privacy. Our "indirect" surveillance regimes, for the most part, are not.
I explore these regimes in the pages that follow, focusing first on
communications contents, second on communications attributes, and
finally on other data.
A. Contents of Communications
1. The "direct" surveillance regime.
Federal law imposes both constitutional and statutory constraints
on the direct collection of the contents of communications by gov-
ernment agents. The Supreme Court concluded in Katz that eaves-
dropping constitutes a "search" for purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment.55 In the wake of Katz, which itself followed a detailed discussion
of the requirements for lawful surveillance in Berger v New York,1
6
Congress adopted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968."7 Also known as the Wiretap Act, the statute re-
quires federal and state officials seeking to "intercept" the contents of
a communication to comply with strict requirements, some of which
55 389 US at 353.
56 388 US 41, 53-60 (1967) (invalidating a New York statute that permitted eavesdropping
without a showing of probable cause).
57 Pub L No 90-351,82 Stat 211, codified as amended at 18 USCA § 2510 et seq (2007).
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exceed those of typical warrants. 5 Courts have fairly consistently in-
terpreted Title III's definition of "intercept," the key determinant of
the statute's scope, to cover only the prospective acquisition of com-
munications as they occur, not the retrospective acquisition of a col-
lection of stored communications." Although the statute initially ap-
plied only to wire communications (that is, communications contain-
ing the human voice and carried over a telecommunications system)
and oral communications (that is, spoken communications in which
one has an expectation of privacy), Congress extended the statute in
1986 to cover electronic communications.6' Law enforcement agents
thus cannot acquire the contents of electronic communications in real
time without complying with the statute's requirements. The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act6' (FISA), which governs surveillance in
the United States (or connected to a United States person) that is de-
signed to acquire the communications of a "foreign power" or an
"agent of a foreign power," similarly prohibits the acquisition of
communications without the approval of a special court, the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).6' Although FISA does not track
Title III, it establishes fairly elaborate procedures for agents to gain
approval of surveillance activities, including generally requiring a show-
ing of probable cause that the targeted facilities are being used or are
about to be used by a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power."
The framework governing agents' acquisition of communications
through activities other than "interception" is somewhat different. The
Fourth Amendment of course provides strong protection of communi-
cations that a user might store on her own computer: if the user has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the computer,
government officials cannot view its contents without obtaining a war-
rant or meeting one of the relevant exceptions to the Fourth Amend-
ment's warrant requirement. Disputes in such cases often involve chal-
58 See 18 USC § 2518 (2000) (describing the procedures required to submit an application
for an order to authorize interception). See also Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the
USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97 Nw U L Rev 607,630-31 (2003) (characteriz-
ing Title III orders as "super-warrants").
59 See, for example, Fraser v Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co, 352 F3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir
2003) (holding that an "intercept" must occur contemporaneously with transmission and does
not apply to recovery of stored email); Steve Jackson Games, Inc v United States Secret Service, 36
F3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir 1994) (same); Wesley College v Pitts, 974 F Supp 375, 388 (D Del 1997)
(same). I discuss the complexities of this issue elsewhere. See Bellia, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1391-95
(cited in note 9) (discussing intercepts under Title III and its amendments in 1986 and 2001).
60 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), §§ 101-11, Pub L No 99-508,
100 Stat 1848, 1848-59, codified as amended in various sections of 18 USCA (2007).
61 Pub L No 95-511,92 Stat 1783, codified as amended at 50 USCA § 1801 et seq (2007).
62 Id.
63 See 50 USC § 1805(a)(3)(B) (2000).
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lenges to warrantless searches and raise questions about whether gov-
ernment agents should have used a warrant-for example, whether
the user has consented; whether the user has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a shared computer; and whether someone else has actual
or apparent authority to consent to the search. 4
What about actions of the government that do not involve "inter-
ception" in a technical sense, but that involve agents' direct acquisition
of communications held by a service provider? For example, suppose
government agents seek stored communications from a subscriber's
Gmail account. Even if seeking stored communications would not
constitute an "interception" for purposes of Title III, another federal
statute regulates the acquisition of stored communications. In 1986,
Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
6
(ECPA), which sought to update federal law to protect emerging
communications technologies. A portion of that statute, also known as
the Stored Communications Act, regulates access to stored communi-
cations and records. The statute prohibits any person from accessing
the facility of a communications service provider, or exceeding access
to that facility, and thereby "obtain[ing], alter[ing], or prevent[ing]
authorized access to" a communication in electronic storage.i The
statute thus prohibits the direct acquisition of communications from
electronic storage within the service provider's system. At the same
time, the SCA exempts law enforcement conduct undertaken under
Title III or under the SCA's own government access provisions, dis-
cussed below.6' The latter provisions deal only with compelled produc-
tion of communications from a service provider,6' not with direct ac-
quisition of communications from a service provider's system. In prac-
tice, then, the only means for law enforcement agents to acquire stored
communications directly, without simply compelling the service pro-
vider to disclose them, is in compliance with the procedures of Title III.
In sum, the regime for direct acquisition of contents of communi-
cations is quite robust: for ongoing acquisition of communications, it
requires Title III's super-warrant procedure or compliance with FISA;
for acquisition of communications stored on a user's own computer, it
requires a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. When
64 See, for example, United States v Morgan, 435 F3d 660,663-64 (6th Cir 2006) (analyzing
the consent and apparent authority questions); United States v Grimes, 244 F3d 375, 383 (5th Cir
2001) (discussing the reasonable expectation of privacy question).
65 ECPA §§ 101-11,100 Stat at 1848.
66 18 USC § 2701(a) (2000).
67 See 18 USC § 2701(c)(3) (2000) (exempting from § 2701(a) liability those individuals
whose activities are authorized under §§ 2703,2704, or 2518).
68 See 18 USCA § 2703.
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communications are stored by a third-party service provider, the only
"direct" acquisition the SCA contemplates is through compliance with
the procedures of Title III.
2. The "indirect" surveillance regime.
When service providers retain copies of communications on their
systems and government agents seek to acquire them from the service
provider rather than to acquire them directly, the legal framework is
far more uncertain. In Miller, the Supreme Court held that the target
of an investigation has no reasonable expectation of privacy in infor-
mation he voluntarily discloses to a third party, even if he discloses the
information for a limited purpose and with the expectation that the
third party will not betray his confidence." The legal framework gov-
erning agents' efforts to acquire communications from service provid-
ers thus depends upon whether the logic of Miller extends to commu-
nications stored with a service provider-a question that the courts
have not yet answered definitively.
In July 2006, the district court in Warshak v United States be-
came the first Article III court to squarely address what legal process
government agents must use to compel production of communications
from a third-party service provider.7' In Warshak, the target of a fraud
investigation challenged the government's use of a subpoena-like
process to compel service providers to produce thousands of emails
stored on their servers, including draft emails, sent emails, and emails
the target had already viewed."
Among the government's arguments in defending the agents' ap-
proach was the claim that an email subscriber cannot have an expecta-
tion of privacy in communications stored with a provider because such
communications are "disclosed" to the provider in the Miller 
sense.13
This position did not carry the day in the district court or the United
69 425 Us at 443.
70 2006 US Dist LEXIS 50076 (SD Ohio), affirmed 490 F3d 455 (6th Cir 2007), vacated for
rehearing en banc 2007 US App LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir 2007).
71 2006 US Dist LEXIS 50076 at *8-20. Along with Professor Susan Freiwald of the Uni-
versity of San Francisco School of Law, I submitted an amicus brief supporting Warshak before
the Sixth Circuit panel, on behalf of professors of internet law and electronic privacy law.
72 Id at *2-3.
73 See United States of America's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, Case No 1:06-cv-00357-SJD, 7-9
(SD Ohio filed July 15, 2006); Brief of the United States of America, Warshak v United States,
Civil Action No 06-4092, 36-40, 43-45 (6th Cir filed Oct 11, 2006), online at http://www.cdt.org/
security/20061127warshak.pdf (visited Jan 12,2008).
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States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,"4 which both held that
use of a subpoena-like process to compel disclosure of a subscriber's
email, without prior notice to the subscriber, violates the Fourth
Amendment. The government, however, pressed the Miller analogy in
its request for en banc review in the Sixth Circuit," which the court
recently granted. This understanding of Miller's applicability has long
guided the Justice Department's interpretation of provisions of the
SCA governing compelled production of communications. In particu-
lar, the SCA distinguishes between two categories of communica-
tions-those in "electronic storage" and those that are not-and ex-
plicitly provides warrant-level protection only for those that are in
electronic storage. The Justice Department has argued that courts
should give weight to Congress's apparent determination that not all
electronic communications are subject to a warrant requirement.
Federal law defines "electronic storage" as any temporary storage
of a communication "incidental to the electronic transmission" and
any storage of a communication "by an electronic communication ser-• ,, 76ThJutc
vice for purposes of backup protection. The Justice Department has
historically interpreted this definition quite narrowly, to apply to
emails stored temporarily on a service provider's system prior to being
retrieved by a subscriber." The emails retrieved in the Warshak case-
that is, emails that Warshak had already viewed as well as those that
Warshak himself sent-are outside of electronic storage as the DOJ
interprets the term. That interpretation necessarily rests on the prem-
ise that compelling production of such emails without a warrant raises
no Fourth Amendment problems-a premise that, in turn, rests on
applicability of the Miller line of cases in this context.
This longstanding interpretation of the scope and structure of the
SCA has not gone unchallenged, even before the Warshak decision.
74 See Warshak v United States, 490 F3d 455,475 (6th Cir 2007) (holding that "[w]here the
third party is not expected to access the e-mails in the normal course of business, however, the
party maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy, and subpoenaing the entity with mere cus-
tody over the documents is insufficient to trump the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement").
75 The government's en bane petition mainly addressed procedural issues, but it included
criticism of the court's approach to the underlying Fourth Amendment issue. Petition of the
United States for Rehearing en Bane, Warshak v United States, Civil Action No 06-4092, 13 (6th
Cir filed Aug 1, 2007), online at http://volokh.com/files/Warshak en-banc.petition.pdf (visited
Jan 12, 2008) (citing Miller and arguing that the constitutionality of compelled disclosure of
electronic communications depends "not on the Fourth Amendment's specific requirements for
warrants, but on reasonableness under the circumstances"). Because the en bane court's action
vacates the panel decision, the government is likely to continue to press the Miller analogy on
rehearing en bane.
76 18 USC § 2510(17) (2000 & Supp 2001).
77 See DOJ, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Evidence in Criminal Investi-
gations § III.B (2002), online at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/s&smanual2002.htm
(visited Jan 12, 2008).
20081
The University of Chicago Law Review
Because the SCA protects communications held in electronic storage
with a provider against unauthorized acquisition by private parties
and government agents alike, a number of cases construing key statu-
tory terms have involved disputes between private parties. In such
cases, courts have divided on how to construe the term "electronic
storage." While several courts have concluded that the term covers
only those communications temporarily stored prior to retrieval by a
subscriber,"8 one court has suggested,79 and another has held'° that the
backup protection prong of the definition is sufficiently broad to en-
compass copies of communications that a subscriber chooses to leave
on a provider's server after downloading them. In disputes between
private parties, of course, the choice between these two interpretations
of the term "electronic storage" does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment. Put another way, courts construing the relevant terms in
cases involving private parties have not had an opportunity to con-
sider how concerns about avoiding constitutional questions might
cabin interpretation of the statutory language. The legislative history
of the SCA itself suggests conflicting views on how the Fourth
Amendment protects electronic communications.8"
In Warshak, neither the district court nor the court of appeals di-
rectly considered the scope of the term "electronic storage," but the
decisions make clear that the DOJ's narrow interpretation of elec-
tronic storage would render the SCA unconstitutional in at least some
circumstances. At the same time, however, the Warshak courts' en-
dorsement of a warrant requirement for indirect communications sur-
veillance was not complete. Both courts seemed to take the view that
a subpoena-like process would satisfy the Fourth Amendment so long
as the government gave the subscriber prior notice of the acquisition.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the courts' approach will survive en
banc review in the Sixth Circuit.
In sum, the shifting architecture of memory has significant conse-
quences for rules governing agents' access to communications. As
communications contents are increasingly held by service providers,
78 See, for example, In re DoubleClick Inc Privacy Litigation, 154 F Supp 2d 497, 512
(SDNY 2001); Fraser v Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co, 135 F Supp 2d 623,636 (ED Pa 2001).
79 Fraser, 352 F3d at 114 (noting that "it seems questionable that the transmissions were
not in backup storage" after emails had been viewed but not yet deleted by a user).
80 Theofel v Farey-Jones, 359 F3d 1066, 1075-77 (9th Cir 2004).
81 Compare S Rep No 99-541 at 3 (cited in note 34) (expressing fear that communications
in the hands of service providers "may be subject to no constitutional privacy protection"), with
HR Rep No 99-647 at 22 (cited in note 34) ("It appears likely ... that the courts would find that
the parties to an e-mail transmission have a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' and that a war-
rant of some kind is required."), 23 (suggesting that the contents of some electronic communica-
tions in storage enjoy a higher degree of Fourth Amendment protection than customer records).
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they are* removed from the robust restrictions on direct government
access drawn from the Fourth Amendment, from Title III, and from
FISA. Once held by third parties, communications are in a zone of
uncertainty with respect to the Fourth Amendment. The SCA does
contain a warrant requirement, but it is unclear whether that require-
ment reaches only those communications not yet delivered to a re-
cipient or if it also reaches communications delivered to a recipient
but maintained on the server. The Warshak decision would have sim-
plified matters by requiring a warrant even as to communications held
by a service provider and already retrieved by the subscriber. But
much uncertainty remains about the scope of that decision and
whether it will withstand further review.
B. Communication Attributes
I now turn to communication "attributes," a term I use to de-
scribe data about communications, such as information about the ori-
gin, destination, and duration of communications.12 Although the di-
rect surveillance regime governing "direct" acquisition of communica-
tions attributes is far less protective than that for direct acquisition of
communications contents, the indirect surveillance regime in some
respects provides still less protection.
1. The "direct" surveillance regime.
The law treats communications attributes quite differently from
the contents of communications. In terms of the Fourth Amendment,
the key precedent is the 1979 case of Smith v Maryland.3 There, the
Supreme Court held, following Miller, that the user of a telephone has
no expectation of privacy in the number he dials because he voluntar-
ily conveys that number to the telephone company so that the call can
be connected." Smith involved the use of a pen register-a device that
records the number of an outgoing call-but its principles apply
equally to the use of a trap and trace device to capture the number of
an incoming call. In 1986, in response to Smith and as part of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, Congress adopted some restric-
tions on the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices."
82 See Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes after the Digital Te-
lephony Act, 69 S Cal L Rev 949, 953 (1996).
83 442 US 735 (1979).
84 Id at 744-45.
85 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Title III ("Pen Register Act"), Pub L
No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848, 1868, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3121-27 (2000 & Supp 2002).
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Although the statute requires government agents to seek a court
order before using a pen register or trap and trace device, the standard
on which an order will be granted is far lower than that required for a
warrant. In particular, the statute states that a judge "shall" enter an
order authorizing use of the device if an attorney for the government
certifies that use of the device will yield information "relevant" to an
ongoing criminal investigation." As amended by the Patriot Act,87
these provisions cover not only dialing information associated with
telephone calls, but also addressing, signaling, and routing information
associated with wire and electronic communications. FISA imposes
similar constraints on the gathering of addressing, signaling, and rout-
ing information for foreign intelligence purposes. Rather than certify-
ing to a judge that the use of the device will yield information relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation, an attorney for the government
must certify that use of the pen register and trap and trace device will
yield information that is relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence or
international terrorism investigation.8
Finally, in a discussion of communications attributes, it is worth
noting the slightly different rules governing acquisition of location
information that can be derived from use of cell phones. By "triangu-
lating" data from cell phone providers concerning the cell towers "hit"
by a targeted cell phone, government agents can approximate the lo-
cation of the phone. The Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act89 (CALEA) bars officials from relying solely on the
pen register and trap and trace statute to obtain this sort of location
information. When seeking to triangulate cell phone data in real time,
then, law enforcement officials initially relied on a "hybrid" approach
that invoked two sets of statutory provisions. In particular, they sought
to rely on the pen/trap provisions as well as provisions in the SCA
allowing law enforcement officers to compel production of certain
records concerning customers of communications service providers.'
The SCA allows law enforcement officials to compel production of
customer records without a warrant. In claiming that a hybrid pen/trap
and SCA order was sufficient to permit law enforcement agents to
triangulate cell data, the government argued that: (1) the location in-
formation was "signaling" information as defined by the pen register
86 18 USC § 3123(a).
87 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("Patriot Act"), Pub L No 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001).
88 50 USCA § 1842(c)(2) (2007).
89 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act § 103(a), Pub L No 103-404, 108
Stat 4279,4280-81, codified at 47 USC § 1002(a) (2000).
90 18 USCA § 2703(c).
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and trap and trace statute; (2) CALEA merely said that that statute
could not be the sole basis for gathering that information, not that it
would not be sufficient if supplemented by other relevant authority;
and (3) that an order satisfying the predicates of both the pen/trap
statute and the customer records provisions of the SCA would be suf-
ficient." Initially, numerous magistrate judges accepted the govern-
ment's argument and granted the requested "hybrid" order. After two
magistrate judges held (based on interpretation of the relevant stat-
utes) that the government could not obtain the information without a
warrant supported by probable cause,12 several others followed in re-
jecting the government's "hybrid" authority theory." Accordingly, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, several courts have treated the ac-
quisition of location information yielded by triangulation of cell
phone data as requiring a warrant.
In sum, although the direct surveillance regime is less protective
of communications attributes than of communications contents, fed-
eral statutes require a court order issued on a relevance standard for
acquisition of such attributes. For location information concerning
mobile devices, courts have as a matter of statutory interpretation re-
quired a warrant.
2. The "indirect" surveillance regime.
Just as Title III applies only to contemporaneous acquisition of
communications, the criminal and foreign intelligence pen register and
trap and trace provisions have been understood to apply only to the
prospective acquisition of communications attributes. When such data
is stored, a different framework applies. In particular, as noted above,
the SCA contains provisions governing the retrospective acquisition
91 See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Authority, 396 F Supp 2d 747, 761 (SD Tex 2005); In the Matter of an Application of the United
States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device, 396 F
Supp 2d 294,316 (EDNY 2005).
92 See In re Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Au-
thority, 396 F Supp 2d at 765; In the Matter of an Application of the United States for an Order Au-
thorizing the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and Trace Device, 396 F Supp 2d at 324.
93 See, for example, In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Disclosure of Prospective Cell Site Information, 412 F Supp 2d 947, 957-58
(ED Wis 2006); In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Prospective Cell Site Information, 407 F Supp 2d 134,135 (DDC 2006);
In re Application of the US. for an Order Authorizing Installation and Use of Pen Register, 415 F
Supp 2d 211,219 (WDNY 2006); In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America
for an Order Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification
System on Telephone Numbers [sealed] and [sealed] and the Production of Real Time Cell Site
Information, 402 F Supp 2d 597,600 (D Md 2005).
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of stored customer records from service providers; these records can
contain precisely the same information that prospective use of pen reg-
isters and trap and trace devices yield. Although the SCA's standards
are similar to those in the pen/trap statute, other authorities permit
production of information on lower standards. Moreover, when law
enforcement officials use a pen register or trap and trace device to cap-
ture attributes of ongoing communications, they will have available to
them only the data on communications occurring at a particular mo-
ment in time. If such data is then stored and retained indefinitely, law
enforcement officials can draw data from that vast pool indefinitely.
The SCA creates two classes of customer data. Where govern-
ment agents seek basic subscriber records, such as the subscriber's
name, address, records of call connections or the time and duration of
sessions, and any number or temporarily assigned network addresses
for the communications, the statute requires only that the agents pre-
sent the provider with a grand jury or administrative subpoena." For
customer records beyond these basic records, the statute requires, at a
minimum, a special court order under § 2703(d), issued based on a
showing of "specific and articulable facts showing that there are rea-
sonable grounds to believe" that the records sought are relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.9 The showing required
under § 2703(d) is thus roughly equivalent to that required under the
pen/trap statute, except that the government must demonstrate rele-
vance rather than merely certifying it.
On the foreign intelligence side, however, the indirect surveil-
lance alternatives are more permissive. In particular, § 2709 of the
SCA grants FBI investigators the authority in certain foreign intelli-
gence investigations to issue so-called "national security letters"
(NSLs) to compel the production of records concerning wire and elec-
tronic communications, described in the statute as "toll billing records
information" and "electronic communication transactional records."97
Although the initial version of this provision required the FBI to cer-
tify that the records sought were connected to a foreign intelligence
investigation and that there were specific and articulable facts linking
the information sought to a foreign power or agent of a foreign power
under FISA,9" the Patriot Act removed the latter requirement." Thus,
the FBI can request stored records of noncontent communications
94 18 USCA § 2703(c).
95 18 USC § 2703(c)(2) (2000 & Supp 2001).
96 18 USCA § 2703(c)(1); 18 USC § 2703(d) (2000 & Supp 2001).
97 18 USCA § 2709.
98 18 USC § 2709 (2000).
99 Patriot Act § 505, 115 Stat at 365, codified at 18 USC § 2709(b) (2000 & Supp 2001).
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attributes merely upon a showing of relevance to a foreign counterin-
telligence investigation and without that showing ever having been
made to a court.
In sum, the shifting architecture of memory for communications
attributes will have important consequences for government access
rules. Government agents' direct acquisition of some communications
attributes is governed by the pen register and trap and trace statute
added as part of ECPA in 1986, whereas its indirect acquisition is gov-
erned by the SCA. The similar legal standards might make that shift
seem insignificant, but those similar standards apply to vastly different
quantities of data. The pen/trap statute is self-limiting because it only
applies to ongoing communications. The SCA provision, in contrast,
can allow agents to collect historical data that would have been virtu-
ally impossible to collect in real time. In other words, the low cost and
high density of current storage technologies make indefinite retention
of data possible, thus preserving a store of information for govern-
ment access for much longer periods of time than the information
would ordinarily be available for direct observation.
C. Transactional and Passive Data
Finally, I consider the direct and indirect surveillance regimes
governing a residual category of data that does not fall into the com-
munications contents or communications attributes categories. Some
of the data might be considered "transactional" data analogous to the
business records at issue in Miller, insofar as it is provided in order to
consummate a transaction. Such data can include information arising
from particular transactions or interactions with third parties, such as
banks, credit card companies, and websites. I also have in mind, how-
ever, the sort of "passive" environmental or experiential data that a
pervasive computing environment is likely to produce.
1. The "direct" surveillance regime.
The direct surveillance regime with respect to the gathering of
noncommunications data is that imposed by the Fourth Amendment
and any relevant statutes exceeding Fourth Amendment requirements.
That is, where gathering particular information would invade a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment would require
a warrant. Importantly, when government agents gather the informa-
tion directly rather than from a third party who is also privy to it, the
mere fact of third-party involvement does not defeat an expectation
of privacy. For example, if law enforcement officials intercepted a
communication from a bank customer to the bank directing a transfer
of certain funds, current doctrine would insist that the interception be
20081
The University of Chicago Law Review
governed by protective direct surveillance rules rather then less strin-
gent indirect surveillance rules. Put another way, the mere involve-
ment of a third party does not eliminate a target's expectation of pri-
vacy; the fact that the third party could reveal the details does not re-
lieve government agents of the obligation to comply with the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement when government agents seek the
information directly.
Similarly, the sorts of passive information that pervasive computing
will yield, if directly observed, would in many cases require compliance
with the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Kyllo itself provides
one example, for it suggests that activity to detect information about
environmental variables inside a home-in that case, the heat emanat-
ing from the home-requires a warrant. ° That is, if a surveillance-
enhancing device yields the same information that previously would
have required physical entry into the home, the Fourth Amendment
requires the agents to proceed as if they were physically entering it.
2. The "indirect" surveillance regime.
Although Miller's implications for communications held by ser-
vice providers are unclear, its implications for other transactional
partners are fairly straightforward. When one transmits information to
a third party for the purpose of processing a particular transaction and
for which the content of the information is relevant, courts will treat
the information as having been "disclosed" and thus not subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy. In some cases, the involvement of
multiple transactional partners-a retailer or intermediaries such as
service providers, credit card companies, and so on-will allow the same
transactional information to be available from multiple third parties.
With respect to the passive environmental or experiential data
produced by developments in pervasive computing, application of
Miller is somewhat more complicated. No deliberate "transmission" of
information occurs; the information is simply "exposed" to third par-
ties by virtue of the pervasive computing application involved. An
early example of such technology might be the increasingly sophisti-
cated digital meters that are being designed to measure electricity
usage at frequent intervals and transmit that information wirelessly to
a utility company. ' These "demand response" systems produce finely
grained information that could ordinarily be collected only by direct
100 See 533 US at 40.
101 See Matt Richtel, Conservation at the Touch of a Button, NY Times H9 (Nov 7, 2007),
online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/business/businessspecial3/07cutoff.html (visited Jan
12,2008).
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surveillance. Once that information is "exposed" to the utility com-
pany, however, its compelled production, if analogized to the com-
pelled production of transactional information in Miller, would not
require a warrant.
Several sector-specific privacy statutes do govern the disclosure
of certain types of records to the government. For example, the Right
to Financial Privacy Act... forbids a financial institution from disclos-
ing a customer's financial records, 3 while the Fair Credit Reporting
Act"° prohibits credit reporting agencies from disclosing credit reports
(beyond certain identifying information).'0 ° Other sector-specific stat-
utes and regulations prohibit cable providers from disclosing cable
records '° and prohibit videotape service providers from disclosing
video rental records.'m These same statutes permit compelled disclo-
sure of these records, with varying standards. The most protective
statute is the Cable Communications Privacy Act. To obtain a court
order compelling disclosure of records under the act, a government
entity must demonstrate "clear and convincing evidence that the sub-
ject of the information is reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal
activity and that the information sought would be material evidence in
the case.".. Other statutes are far less protective. The RFPA, for exam-
ple, authorizes use of administrative and grand jury subpoenas to com-
pel disclosure of records, as long as the subject of the data has the op-
portunity to contest the subpoena. "9
These sector-specific rules ultimately create only a patchwork of
protection for transactional data. Because Miller may apply in a vari-
ety of contexts in which a person generates data that is later held by a
third party, the statutes requiring a warrant in this situation form the
exception rather than a rule: outside of these contexts (and in the ab-
sence of contractual restrictions or restrictions deriving from prohibi-
tions on unfair trade practices), government entities can compel a
third party to produce records with a grand jury or administrative
subpoena without prior notice to the subject of the data. In addition,
because the statutes focus on the activities of particular classes of re-
cord holders rather than the records themselves, they do not fully pro-
tect even those records they cover. For example, the RFPA protects
102 Right to Financial Privacy Act § 1103, 92 Stat at 3697, codified at 12 USC § 3403 (2000).
103 See 12 USC § 3403(a).
104 84 Stat at 1128, codified in relevant part at 15 USCA § 1681b (2007).
105 See 15 USC § 1681f (2000).
106 See 47 USC § 551(h).
107 See 18 USC § 2710.
108 See 47 USC § 551(h)(1).
109 12 USC §§ 3402,3405,3407 (2000). The Act also authorizes the use of search warrants to
compel disclosure of records without prior notice to the data subject. 12 USC § 3406 (2000).
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against a financial institution's disclosure of financial records, but not
against the disclosure of financial records by another third party who
might lawfully have acquired such records. Finally, even the statutes
providing warrant-like protection contain important exceptions, par-
ticularly in the case of national security investigations. The FCRA and
the RFPA, for example, both allow certain agencies to compel disclo-
sure of records by issuing national security letters analogous to those
discussed with respect to communications attributes.10 Although each
specific NSL authority differs, all NSL provisions allow officials in the
executive branch to compel disclosure of material upon certification
of relevance to a national security investigation.
III. CLOSING THE LAW'S MEMORY GAP
The discussion in Part II suggests that the changing architecture
of memory-its increasing scope, and the fact that much of it is in
third-party control-has destabilizing effects on our communications
surveillance law regime. Communications that could once be acquired
only prospectively, at a specific moment in time, and under strict stan-
dards, can now be acquired retrospectively, at any moment in time,
and under less stringent standards. Communications attributes that
could once be acquired prospectively and at a specific moment in time
(under an admittedly less stringent standard) can now be acquired
retrospectively, at any time, from a far broader pool of information
than direct acquisition could have produced. Finally, the categories of
transactional data available from third parties are expanding dramati-
cally and are available indefinitely.
How should we evaluate these trends, and how, if at all, should
the law respond to them? I do not claim that the law can or must re-
quire data destruction across the various categories of information
discussed here, although there may be good reasons for companies,
particularly those holding transactional data, to anonymize or destroy
data after a certain time period. I also do not address the conse-
quences of data transfers from one private party to another, though
the consequences for such practices of the changing architecture of
memory may be quite significant. I argue that with respect to some
categories of information, we must harmonize the direct and indirect
government surveillance regimes, and harmonize them in the direction
of the more protective direct surveillance regimes. My analysis pro-
ceeds in three steps. I first consider in Part III.A whether develop-
ments in technology or other market changes are likely to restore
110 See 12 USCA § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2007); 15 USCA § 1681u(a)-(c) (2007).
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communications and other information to legal categories subject to
more direct and thus more highly protected surveillance. In other words, I
consider the possibility that even if current shifts raise significant infor-
mation privacy concerns, those shifts are likely to reestablish an equilib-
rium in which information returns to more protected categories
I then confront these privacy concerns more directly in Part III.B.
One could argue that whatever level of information privacy may have
resulted from the combination of the prevailing legal regime and the
imperfect architecture of memory, there is no reason for the law to
privilege surveillance imperfections. Evaluation of that argument to
some extent requires delving into normative conceptions of informa-
tion privacy. Such conceptions often do not produce an account of
information privacy that is finely grained enough to dictate particular
substantive rules or institutional arrangements. I nevertheless argue
that whatever level of information privacy such theories might pro-
duce as a matter of first principles, there are strong arguments for fa-
voring stable application of certain key constitutional and quasi-
constitutional baselines in surveillance law. Although formulated in
terms of particular surveillance techniques, those baselines are con-
cerned at their core with the information acquired rather than the
techniques themselves. In Part III.C, I suggest how we might translate
those baselines for a world of increasingly perfect memory.
A. Technological Change and Other Market Developments
Parts I and II demonstrated that the increasingly perfect architec-
ture of memory has shifted information out of categories involving
highly regulated surveillance. These changes are significant, however,
only if they reflect a new equilibrium rather than a temporary pendu-
lum swing. We therefore must consider more fully any trends that
might cut against data retention. Part I discussed some of these trends,
including companies' concerns about the liability and other risks of
large-scale data breaches."' Those concerns, however, are likely to be
more prominent with respect to collection and retention of transac-
tional data than with respect to retention of communications contents.
Transactional data is often retained for the benefit of the company
rather than for the benefit of the subject of the data, and the com-
pany's retention policy is unlikely to be a major marketing tool. For
providers that store communications, in contrast, the user's ability to
maintain communications indefinitely is itself a selling point-making
111 See Part I.C.3.
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it far more likely that the provider will respond to liability concerns by
investing in security rather than purging data.
Even for providers that retain transactional data, investing more
heavily in security measures and purging data are simply two ways to
forestall a large-scale data breach, and the mix a company chooses will
take account of the opportunities lost when the company purges data.
In other words, it is unlikely that the danger of a private party's breach
of a company's servers will fully counter the trend toward data reten-
tion; more likely, it will cause the company to insure against such a
breach or otherwise internalize the costs of securing the network.
Moreover, there is little reason for a provider settling upon a data re-
tention policy to factor government access rules into its decisions.
Current statutes contemplate government reimbursement for the di-
rect costs a provider incurs for complying with a government request
for information."' The secrecy that generally surrounds government
requests will also make other, indirect costs of compliance-such as
the reputational costs a provider may experience by virtue of disclos-
ing information to government agents-less significant, and any such
costs may be balanced by the "good citizen" image that the provider's
compliance can promote.
Potentially more relevant are mechanisms that may develop to al-
low users to retain more technical control over their stored communi-
cations even while they are maintained on third party servers. Con-
sider a possible model for the remote storage of documents that is
somewhat more complex than that prevailing today. Rather than re-
taining a full file on a particular computer, a provider might distribute
pieces of the file across different servers, so that no single server holds
all pieces of it. These pieces would be reassembled into the whole file
only when the subscriber (or the subscriber's computer) produces a
particular security credential.
Even if this remote storage model were to prevail, it is unclear
that it would shift communications back from the category of largely
unregulated surveillance to the category of highly regulated surveil-
lance. The third party would hold pieces of the file rather than a single
file, so in theory it would be more difficult for the government simply
to compel the provider to produce the stored file. Although such an
approach may have important security benefits (by rendering attacks
on the provider's servers relatively less effective), it is unlikely to af-
fect the provider's ability to comply with the government's request for
112 See, for example, 18 USC § 2518(4) ("Any provider of wire or electronic communication
service, landlord, custodian or other person furnishing such facilities or technical assistance shall
be compensated therefor by the applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in providing such
facilities or assistance.").
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disclosure of communications. Among the forces driving the market
toward remote storage, of course, is the ease with which subscribers
can access files from multiple computers or devices. Much of the con-
venience would be lost if the provider did not offer a mechanism for
reassembling the file in the event that the security credential were
unavailable to a legitimate subscriber. If the provider escrowed or
archived the credential, or if government agents could replicate it
through a "brute force" attack' (as they have successfully done in
most cases involving encryption), then the availability of pieces of the
file on the provider's servers may be enough to keep such information
in the less stringent indirect surveillance regime.
In short, it seems unlikely that developments in technology alone
will move communications and data back into the more protective
directive surveillance regimes.
B. Normative Conceptions of Information Privacy
Even if the evolving architecture of memory has brought a new
equilibrium, it does not follow that we must respond by reviving the
old one. There is, after all, nothing inevitable about the sort of surveil-
lance imperfections that the new architecture of memory overcomes.
Consider a parallel example from copyright law. Many scholars argue
that technology "perfects" a content provider's control over the
scholar's work, allowing the content provider to block uses that the
copyright law would permit. Scholars who object to this development
claim that this "perfection" of control shrinks the space for uses of a
work that the law, combined with the copyholder's imperfect technical
control, has always permitted. Such views embed normative claims
about the value of public uses as well as predictive claims about the
amount of control necessary to supply incentives for creation. Those
who are less concerned about public uses or make different predictions
about how to stimulate development of new works are unlikely to share
these concerns about the perfection of a copyright holder's control.
Similarly, evaluating the consequences of the changing architec-
ture of memory to some extent requires us to draw upon normative
theories of information privacy. Such theories will obviously call for
protection of different underlying interests, for different reasons, with
different levels of protection afforded, under different institutional
arrangements and procedures. Consider three (overlapping) catego-
ries of theories of the value of information privacy: theories focusing
113 A brute force attack involves the use of raw computing power to try every possible key.
See, for example, Matt Curtin, Brute Force: Cracking the Data Encryption Standard 23 (Coperni-
cus Books 2005).
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on the constitutive importance of privacy (that is, the importance of
privacy for autonomy and individual self-determination);" those fo-
cusing on the role of information privacy in ensuring a robust ex-
change of ideas, either as a good in and of itself or for the contribu-
tions of such an exchange to the political process;"' and those viewing
privacy through the lens of economic utility. '
These divergent approaches might call for protection of different
underlying interests. For example, normative theories of privacy that
focus on autonomy and self-determination are more likely to call for
protection of a "dignitary" interest in privacy than are theories focus-
ing on economic utility. Ensuring information privacy might instead
mean guaranteeing the secrecy of certain information, regardless of
the invasion used to acquire it. As many scholars have pointed out,
behaviors in commercial transactions tend to demonstrate that con-
sumers neither expect nor are willing to pay to maintain complete se-
crecy of information, but rather may wish to maintain secrecy selec-
tively vis-A-vis certain potential recipients (such as the government).
Those who favor constitutive or deliberative approaches to privacy
might perceive selective secrecy as necessary to ensuring unfettered
communication, whether in the development of individual preferences
or for benefits in the political process. Even those who approach in-
formation privacy questions from the perspective of economic utility
might recognize the costs of a no-privacy condition.
Although different normative conceptions of privacy may point
to the need to protect different underlying interests, each conception
can coexist with a regime involving some level of government surveil-
lance activity, if only because some level of security is necessary for
the individual and collective self-determination that information pri-
vacy is thought to support. Put another way, no normative conception
114 See, for example, Cohen, 52 Stan L Rev at 1423 (cited in note 17) (advocating "a dynamic
theory of informational privacy ... that focuses on the conditions for meaningful autonomy").
115 See, for example, Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand L
Rev 1609, 1651 (1999) ("In the absence of strong rules for information privacy, Americans will
hesitate to engage in cyberspace activities-including those that are most likely to promote
democratic self-rule.").
116 See, for example, George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics,
9 J Legal Stud 623, 625 (1980) (characterizing privacy as a property right in information and
discussing economic consequences of errors in or misuse of this information); Richard A. Posner,
The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga L Rev 393, 394 (1978) (analyzing privacy as an "intermediate good"
and assuming that people do not "desire or value privacy or prying in themselves but to use
these goods as inputs into the production of income or some other broad measure of utility or
welfare"). But see Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic
Defense of Privacy, 84 Georgetown L J 2381, 2383 (1996) (arguing that economic analysis of
privacy has failed to account for "benefits to privacy beyond the 'taste' for privacy that an indi-
vidual may have" and has inadequately analyzed default rules for subsequent disclosure of an-
other's personal information).
[75:137
The Memory Gap in Surveillance Law
of privacy entirely excludes the possibility of communications surveil-
lance. One's normative precommitments might call for insistence on a
higher substantive standard (probable cause as opposed to relevance)
or a particular institutional arrangement (involving judicial rather
than executive evaluation of whether probable cause exists), but all
would accept the basic goal of a communications surveillance law re-
gime: to establish appropriate standards and institutional arrange-
ments for moderating competing security and privacy interests.
The flip side of this point, which I also take as a given, is that no
normative conception of privacy is consistent with a view that security
benefits flow inexorably from the gathering of more information. That
is, the mere fact that more information exists in storable form and is
thus indefinitely available for government examination does not itself
create the imperative to collect and analyze that information. Other
factors- pressing concerns about terrorism, for example-may create
imperatives for government entities to use all the information that is ac-
cessible to them. If so, the questions shift to what standards should govern
access to the information, under what procedures (or institutional ar-
rangements), and, perhaps most critically, who-the executive, the legis-
lature, or the courts-gets to select these standards and procedures.
Under current law, the Fourth Amendment's "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy" test of course acts as a trigger for answers to each of
these questions. When a court determines that a particular govern-
ment tactic invades a reasonable expectation of privacy, the court
thereby dictates both a standard for access (generally probable cause)
and the institutional arrangement (review by a neutral and detached
magistrate). When a particular government tactic does not invade a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the standards and institutional ar-
rangements are left to the legislature or, in its silence, the executive.
But new technologies in general, and the changing architecture of
memory in particular, present two obvious and related challenges for
the reasonable expectation of privacy test. The first concerns whether
the assessment of whether government action "invades" a reasonable
expectation of privacy depends upon the method of acquiring data or
information or the type of information or data that is acquired. The
Katz Court seemed to focus on the latter, insofar as it suggested that
one who occupies a telephone booth "is surely entitled to assume that
the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world" and rejected the argument that government agents' eaves-
dropping did not implicate the Fourth Amendment because "the sur-
veillance technique ... involved no physical penetration of the tele-
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phone booth. '"7 Similarly, the Court in Kyllo focused heavily on the
fact that the information yielded by a thermal imaging device was in-
formation about what was going on inside of the target's home."' At
the same time, the Kyllo Court suggested that widespread use of a
particular surveillance-enhancing device might defeat the reasonable-
ness of an expectation of privacy, suggesting that even the Fourth
Amendment's protection of a most sensitive category of informa-
tion-information on what goes on in the home-may be limited to
use of particular surveillance techniques. "9
This ambiguity about whether the measure of a putative invasion
of privacy should depend upon the means or the result of the invasion
complicates legislative efforts to implement the Fourth Amendment.
In the case of communications surveillance, Congress has translated
rules that seem to focus on the privacy of the information that is ac-
quired into rules that focus on the use of particular techniques or de-
vices. Title III, for example, protects the contents of communications,
but only against one form of acquisition -interception- and courts
have construed the statute not to apply to use of other means to ac-
quire functionally equivalent communications. Whether this device-
based focus results from the courts' interpretation of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test or instead reflects a legislative gloss on that
test, it has the practical effect of privileging executive choices about
the standards and procedures under which surveillance activities will
proceed. That is, once the Katz holding is codified as a rule prohibiting
"interception" without a Title III order, that fairly narrow rule permits
other surveillance techniques yielding the same information to prevail
unless and until Congress or the courts supply an alternative rule. The
pre-Patriot Act pen register and trap and trace device statute pro-
vides another example of the degree of executive control over the
standards and procedures governing surveillance, albeit a statutory
rather than constitutional one.'20 Prior to passage of the Patriot'Act,
the pen/trap statute was written in terms that appeared to relate spe-
cifically to devices used to acquire dialing information associated with
an incoming or outgoing telephone call. The development of electronic
communications raised the question whether addressing information-
not to mention a range of other information-associated with elec-
tronic communications fell under the statute and therefore required
117 389 US at 352 (emphasis added).
118 533 US at 34.
119 Id at 40 (recognizing that defendant's expectation of privacy was reasonable in part
because surveillance was conducted with "a device that is not in general public use").
120 See 18 USC §§ 3121-27.
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law enforcement compliance with certain procedures. ' The DOJ took
the position that addressing information associated with electronic
communications did fall under the statute, but the particular language
of the statute would have made it easy for the DOJ to instead con-
clude that the information was entirely unregulated by the statute or
the Constitution and was therefore freely available to government
agents. In other words, the decision to read the narrow and device-
based statute to cover techniques yielding information analogous to
that obtained by pen register and trap and trace devices reflected ex-
ecutive rather than legislative or judicial choices.
The second challenge the reasonable expectation of privacy test
raises involves how courts determine what constitutes a "reasonable"
expectation when new communications technologies are at issue. One
possible approach would be a positive or empirical one, designed to
measure actual beliefs about the privacy of particular technologies.
Apart from the fact that an empirical assessment of such beliefs can
be difficult for courts, ' those beliefs may be influenced by factors that
are tangential to the core concerns of the Fourth Amendment. For
example, actual societal perceptions about privacy may be based on
the positive law protecting communications, the degree to which that
law is actually enforced, and even the marketing strategies of those
who sell software designed to protect the security of computer sys-
tems. A normative approach to measuring privacy expectations-that
is, one that asks not what privacy users do expect but what privacy
they should be entitled to expect-may be preferable to a positive or
empirical one. The Court's reasoning in Katz to some degree reflects
this approach,"3 as does the decision of the Sixth Circuit panel in War-
shak. But even if a court's approach to the reasonable expectation of
privacy test should be a normative one, there are a range of interests
that a normative analysis could take into account. Discussion of the
range of possible interests is beyond the scope of this essay; for now, it
is sufficient to point out that how courts measure societal expectations
will affect the role that courts can play in moderating the security and
121 I discuss this issue at greater length elsewhere. See Bellia, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1432-33
(cited in note 9).
122 See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 Stan Tech L Rev
3, 1 8, 23, online at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/freiwald-first-principles.pdf (visited Jan 12, 2008)
("Courts have either avoided the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, or have cut short
the analysis, because they lack adequate empirical data for the positive inquiry and adequate
guidance for the normative one.").
123 As Susan Freiwald has pointed out, the vulnerabilities of the telephone to illegal private
and governmental wiretapping were well known at the time the Court decided Katz. Id at 28. See
also Smith, 442 US at 740-41 n 5 (noting that if influences "alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms" have conditioned subjective expectations, normative analysis is required).
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privacy interests at stake in communications surveillance. An under-
developed conception of how to measure societal expectations will
privilege executive decisions about the standards and procedures that
should govern agents' activities.
My point is emphatically not that the acquisition of communica-
tions or other data amounts to a Fourth Amendment event regardless
of circumstances. My point, rather, is that the current communications
surveillance law framework tends to privilege executive decisions
about how to moderate security and privacy considerations, especially
when new technologies are involved. The executive is likely to have
some institutional advantages over courts in assessing whether na-
tional security or other imperatives require government access to cer-
tain categories of information, but it has no advantages over courts
and legislatures in choosing the standards or procedures that should
govern that access.
Indeed, the example of the DOJ's interpretation of how to apply
the pen register and trap and trace statute to addressing information
associated with electronic communications is somewhat unusual. The
Department's general approach to changes in communications tech-
nologies has been to attempt to guarantee its continued access to the
communications that it has traditionally been able to reach, without
altering the legal predicates for access. That position guided the legis-
lative efforts that culminated in passage of the CALEA, which essen-
tially required the telecommunications industry to design its digital
equipment so as to preserve law enforcement agents' ability to acquire
communications contents and attributes that have traditionally been
available in an analog environment. That sort of posture, however, does
not account for the new categories of information accessible under or
outside of existing legal standards, or the vastly greater volume of in-
formation within some of the traditional legal categories. In other
words, the government's impulse in seeking not to lose access to catego-
ries of communications that it could traditionally access is an under-
standable one, but it does not take account of how dramatically those
categories have expanded.
Although not directly related to the requirements of CALEA,
the disjoint between Congress's intent in passing the Stored Commu-
nications Act in 1986 and the current effect of that statute is particu-
larly telling. Title III codified Katz and Berger, and in 1986 Congress
extended Title III to bar the interception of electronic communica-
tions. But Congress treated stored electronic communications in a
fundamentally different way. The trends in the cost and density of
storage and the structure of the online storage market show why Con-
gress might have done so. Storage was expensive-indeed, 100,000
times as expensive as it is today. Long-term storage was envisioned to
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be a tool of the business community, hence the business-record-like
treatment of materials in long-term storage with the provider of a
"remote computing service." Congress simply could not have envi-
sioned that long-term storage trends would eventually permit gov-
ernment agents to acquire communications analogous to those cov-
ered by Title III, but under far lower standards. As discussed earlier,
the SCA distinguishes between communications that are held in "elec-
tronic storage" by the provider of an electronic communications ser-
vice, and communications that are maintained by the provider of a
remote computing service, with the former category receiving higher
protection than the latter. Even if Congress intended the former cate-
gory to reach only communications not yet retrieved by a subscriber,
evolution of the architecture of memory would now cause the lower
legal standard to apply to a vastly greater quantity of information than
it reached in 1986.
In other words, the government's approach of seeking to keep
pace with technological developments by maintaining its technical
ability to acquire the same sorts of communications that it could ac-
quire in an analog environment, while maintaining the same legal stan-
dards for access, may be a reasonable one. But to the extent that it fo-
cuses on types of communications while overlooking questions of scale,
it begs the question of whether different legal standards should apply.
C. Communications Surveillance for the New Architecture
of Memory
Part III.B established that the changing architecture of memory
raises critical questions about the substantive standards for access to
communications and other information, the procedures or institu-
tional arrangements for implementing those standards, and, above all,
the overarching issue of institutional choice. Current Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine, as implemented in the main federal communications
surveillance statutes, tends to focus narrowly on surveillance tech-
niques and to assess societal privacy expectations in positive rather
than normative terms, with the result that constraints on executive
conduct tend to be fairly narrow.
I argue here that the dramatic changes in the architecture of
memory require that courts applying the Fourth Amendment to sur-
veillance technique controversies and legislatures seeking to imple-
ment or supplement the Fourth Amendment attend to the results of
communications surveillance as much as to the methods used. Predigi-
tal constitutional baselines for communications surveillance serve as a
useful starting point, and we can analyze current surveillance tech-
niques by assessing whether the techniques produce information that
is functionally equivalent to information that direct surveillance pro-
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duces. We can measure functional equivalence in two ways. Qualita-
tively, we might consider one surveillance tactic to be functionally
equivalent to another if it yields the same type of information, or a
different type of information that plays the same role, as information
yielded by another method that does have Fourth Amendment impli-
cations. The example of demand response technology illustrates the
former. In Kyllo, the Court assessed use of a thermal imaging device in
the same way as it would assess a physical entry into the home be-
cause it produced the same kind of information. Similarly, compelling
production of information from the utility company yields, in qualita-
tive terms, the same information as entering the home (if not more).
A quantitative measure may also be important in some cases. As-
suming law enforcement officials seek to gather information that is
functionally equivalent to information previously available in some
other form under a low constitutional or statutory standard, their ac-
tivities may raise more concern if they will involve a vastly greater
pool of information.
I consider these questions in more detail, focusing separately on
communications contents, communications attributes, and transac-
tional and passive data.
1. Contents of communications.
I have already alluded to the possibility that retrospective analy-
sis of communications can produce the same type of communications
as prospective acquisition of communications over a period of time.
Title III and the SCA, however, treat such information quite differ-
ently, and the SCA itself contains multiple standards that some inter-
pret to grant less protection to communications a provider continues
to hold after the subscriber accesses them. By qualitative measures,
there is no distinction between communications gathered prospec-
tively and the same communications gathered in one or a series of
retrospective collections.
There is nevertheless one intuitively appealing reason to distin-
guish between ongoing, prospective surveillance and a one-time retro-
spective collection of communications or information. Professor Paul
Ohm considers these issues in relation to what he calls a Fourth Amend-
ment "right to delete.' 2. The right to delete data, he argues, may ac-
count for why email messages implicate the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement if they are acquired by police in real time, but
(perhaps) not if they are acquired from storage: one cannot delete
124 Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment Right to Delete, 119 Harv L Rev F 10, 11 (2005),
online at http://www harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/decO5/ohm.shtml.
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data as it is transmitted in real time, but one can do so retrospectively.
As a result, he suggests, surveillance of information that one has no
opportunity to delete is more invasive than surveillance of informa-
tion that one does have an opportunity to delete. '
It is not clear whether this aspect of Professor Ohm's account is
intended to be purely explanatory or normative. If it is intended to be
normative, there are two difficulties with it. First, the right to delete is
by no means complete. With respect to email providers, users have no
ability to delete communications that are within the service provider's
rather than the user's control. Even to the extent that users do have
the technical ability to delete communications, it is unclear that Fourth
Amendment or statutory analysis should give that technical ability
categorical weight. To the extent that there are competing incentives
to retain data, the decision to do so should not be taken as forfeiting
any privacy interest. Any other conclusion would permit the sub-
scriber's choice to contract with a provider to store communications to
dictate legal standards for producing such communications, thereby
distorting the subscriber's incentives. On a related note, users' choices
about whether to retain or delete communications are unlikely to be
"informed" ones as to the privacy consequences of those choices. In
prior work I have discussed the importance of so-called "information
structures" in surveillance law-that is, institutional design mecha-
nisms that permit public (and congressional) evaluation of the effec-
tiveness of a surveillance law regime. In particular, I have argued that
such mechanisms can serve privacy-protective and law-articulating
functions and thus have a special role to play in the context of surveil-
lance practices not subject to prior judicial approval (or subject to
judicial approval under a low standard). 26
One important aspect of the shift from direct to indirect surveil-
lance is that it entails a shift from a regime with a robust information
structure to a regime with virtually no such structure. Quite apart
from the privacy-protective and law-articulating functions of an in-
formation structure, the absence of such a structure can have market-
distorting effects that in turn shape data retention practices. Through-
out this essay I have focused on the connection between private data
retention practices and government surveillance practices, without
considering the implications of private party collection and exchanges
of data. Arguments against government involvement in regulating the
private collection and transfer of data are likely to proceed from the
125 Id at 15.
126 See Patricia L. Bellia, The "Lone Wolf"Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance, 50 Viii L Rev 425,467-76 (2005) (advocating changes to FISA's information structure).
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view that user preferences, and thus an optimal amount of privacy
protection, will be achieved through market forces. Even if one ac-
cepts this perspective, the lack of information on indirect government
surveillance practices will prevent users from signaling concerns about
these practices. In fact, in this context consumers face double-layered
secrecy: unknown government surveillance practices play off of un-
known private retention practices.
2. Communications attributes.
Turning to communications attributes, if we analyze the type of in-
formation agents can collect regarding electronic communications, we
see that it is a much more expansive category than the phone numbers
at issue in Smith. Qualitatively, some information associated with elec-
tronic communications may be similar in that it performs the same
function of allowing the provider to direct the communication. As I
have noted, however, if service providers can store communications
attributes indefinitely, law enforcement officials can draw data from a
larger pool and at any time, rather than simply as the communications
occur. In quantitative terms, then, communications attributes involve a
significant move away from the constitutional baseline of Smith.
3. Transactional and passive data.
Transactional data presents difficulties similar to those presented
by communications attributes. Here the constitutional baseline is
Miller, which at a minimum suggests that business records produced in
a customer's relationship with a transactional partner are not subject
to a reasonable expectation of privacy. In terms of whether transac-
tional data is qualitatively equivalent to the records at issue in Miller,
some such data clearly is analogous. For example, purchase of an item
online will generate a record of a credit transaction similar to that
generated with a brick-and-mortar store. The data, however, may also
include data giving rise to inferences that are simply not otherwise
available without direct physical observation. For example, a record of
a customer's interaction with an online bookseller will include not
only the items purchased, but also the items browsed. And to the ex-
tent that lower standards might be justified on the theory that the data
subject has some control over the data trail-for example, by limiting
a site's use of cookies to link information across pages and visits-that
control again proves to be elusive. Once created or collected, data is
treated as being "owned" by the transactional partner, and any ability
to control its disposition depends on the data retention and destruc-
tion policies that the transactional partner chooses to implement. As
for control over the creation and collection of data itself, the lack of
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information on a transactional partner's retention practices means that
consumers will be unable to make informed choices in this regard.
Finally, the sort of passive data that pervasive computing applica-
tions can produce, particularly about events inside the home, will be
qualitatively equivalent to direct observations by government agents
that are treated as searches under the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The changing architecture of memory raises fundamental ques-
tions about the application of well-entrenched rules for communica-
tions surveillance. An underdeveloped conception of societal privacy
expectations and narrowly drafted statutes essentially encourage gov-
ernment agents to exploit the new architecture. The law thus under-
protects communications that are functionally equivalent to commu-
nications that receive the highest protection under our surveillance
law regime. And despite the weak constitutional baselines for com-
munications attributes and transactional data, there are strong rea-
sons, related both to the quantity of information available and the
inferences that can be drawn from it, to tweak our current surveillance
law regimes to provide heightened protection. I do not contend that
the changing architecture of memory counsels in favor of high-level
and Fourth Amendment-based protection in all cases. Rather, I argue
that courts and legislatures cannot gain a full picture of the surveil-
lance law landscape without accounting for the changing architecture
of memory, and that the changing architecture of memory should af-
fect that landscape.
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